Explanatory memorandum why a revision of the treaties

It is important to note that while Canadian recent practice dictates that Memoranda of Understanding or Arrangements are not legally-binding, not all States view these instruments as such. Simply labelling a document as a "Memorandum of Understanding" or "Arrangement" is not enough to ensure that it will not be considered as an agreement governed by public international law by some of the participants to the instrument. Departments and agencies should take care to ascertain before negotiating a non-binding arrangement that the other participants agree that the arrangement is not binding at public international law.

Treaties and other agreements governed by public international law are entered into by Canada. Memoranda of Understanding and similar arrangements can be between Canada and another sovereign state, but much more commonly are between a Canadian Government department, an agency or a province or other sub-national government or para-statal organization and a similar body in another country. Although considered non-binding by Canada, such instruments do have a form and must respect Canadian policies and practices, including the foreign policy of the Canadian Government, Canadian and international law.

It is Government policy that any such instrument entered into by any Federal Government department or agency should be in both English and French. The terminology used in drafting non-legally binding instruments must clearly indicate that these are not legally binding instruments. The provisions of such an instrument should be cast as expressions of intent rather than as obligations.

Policy Approval in the conclusion of a non-legally binding instrument. To ensure that Canada maintains a record of all its international commitments the Government established the policy that the originals of Memoranda of Understanding and similar non-binding arrangements be kept by the Treaty Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

Skip to main content Skip to "About this Web application". Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament 1. Effective Date This policy is effective as of the date of its announcement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Policy Objective The objective of this policy is to ensure that all instruments governed by public international law, between Canada and other states or international organizations, are tabled in the House of Commons following their signature or adoption by other procedure and prior to Canada formally notifying that it is bound by the instrument.

Policy Statement The Government's Policy on the Tabling of treaties in Parliament is as follows: The Minister of Foreign Affairs will initiate the tabling of all instruments, accompanied by a brief Explanatory Memorandum in the House of Commons following their adoption by signature or otherwise, and prior to Canada's expression of its consent to be bound by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs will initiate the tabling in the House of Commons of other documents relating to free trade agreements in accordance with the specific requirements set out in this policy. Definitions 5. The Convention defines treaty in Article 2 as follows: "Treaty means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument, or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

Treaties can be bilateral, multilateral or plurilateral. Bilateral treaties are those between Canada and one other country. Multilateral treaties are those between three or more countries, generally developed under the auspices of international organizations. Plurilateral treaties are generally entered into between one State and a group of States. Agreements between Canada and International Organizations are often treaties governed by public international law.

Policy Requirements 6. In this way a proper distinction between treaties and other international instruments that are not binding in public international law can be maintained; Annex C discusses these instruments. For ensuring that this policy is followed fully within their own organization; For ensuring that the Treaty Section has sufficient lead-time to verify the texts in all languages and to ensure that proper government authority is obtained before Canada signs the treaty or expresses its consent to be bound by it.

When treaties do not require implementing legislation, the Government will observe a waiting period of at least twenty-one sitting days after a treaty is tabled before taking legal steps to bring the treaty into force.

During this twenty-one sitting day period, Members of Parliament could initiate a debate. Members of Parliament might also request a vote on a motion regarding the treaty in the House of Commons.

For example, Opposition parties may use an Opposition day to debate and to present and subsequently vote on a motion. The Government will not seek the legal authority to be bound by the instrument before this twenty-one day period has been observed.

For treaties that require implementing legislation before the Government can proceed to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession "ratification" , the Government will: Observe a waiting period of at least twenty-one sitting days before the introduction of the necessary implementing legislation in Parliament; Will allow Members of Parliament the same opportunities to debate, present and vote on motions, as for those treaties which do not require implementing legislation; Will subsequently introduce the implementing legislation for these treaties; and Seek, only when the legislation is adopted, the authorization from the Governor in Council to express consent to be bound by the treaty.

For multilateral treaties that do not provide for signature and for which there is no two-step approval process the Government will: Table the treaty in the House of Commons for at least twenty-one sitting days prior to taking action to ratify the treaty.

In this case, the following procedure applies: The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the lead Ministers would seek approval from the Prime Minister for an exemption to the tabling process. This is to be done through a joint-letter that clearly articulates the rationale for the exemption.

For exceptions to the tabling process under paragraph 6. Where it is necessary to obtain an exemption to the requirement to table an economic impact assessment, if the responsible Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are early on aware of the need to request such an exemption, a request shall be made in the Memorandum to Cabinet seeking policy approval to enter into negotiations or to sign the treaty, as appropriate.

The Memorandum to Cabinet should clearly articulate the rationale for the exception to the tabling process. If an exception to the tabling process under paragraph 6. The purpose of the Explanatory Memorandum is to provide the House of Commons with information regarding the content of the Treaty. See Annex B for the template for an Explanatory Memorandum.

The Executive under the constitutional treaty-making power exercised by the Federal Crown under the Royal Prerogative remains responsible for undertaking any international obligations of Canada ; The Government will then decide whether to ratify the Treaty or to introduce legislation that may be necessary before bringing the Treaty into force. If the Government decides to proceed, the Treaty Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development will work with the responsible Department and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Division to complete the final process: A submission to the Governor in Council to obtain the authorization to ratify the treaty; and Once the Order in Council is granted, the Treaty Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development will take the necessary actions to bring the treaty into force.

Treaty-making process This Policy on tabling Treaties in the House of Commons is part of the policy followed in Canada for entering into binding international obligations. Non-binding International Instruments Under international law, a treaty creates international legal obligations for Canada.

In order to avoid situations where instruments that, could reasonably be viewed to be treaties, and therefore covered by the Government's policy, are not mistakenly classified as non-binding instruments and thus not brought to the attention of the House of Commons, each Department is responsible for ensuring that the proper distinction is made between treaties and non-binding instruments, in consultation with the Treaty Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

Publishing, registration and safekeeping of Instruments The Treaty Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development maintains the official government archive of originals of bilateral treaties and certified copies of multilateral treaties. All treaties in force for Canada whether bilateral or multilateral will be published in the Canada Treaty Series and distributed to more than depositories in Canada and around the World.

Texts of most treaties that apply to Canada will be published on the Internet, bilateral treaties as soon as they enter into force and multilateral treaties if possible when the certified copy is received from the depositary of the treaty. However, all Federal government departments and agencies are accountable for ensuring that: The policy is implemented in their own organization; Their personnel engaged at any steps when creating commitments with other governments e.

Monitoring The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development must ensure that its tabling activities are effective and efficient; The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development will undertake periodic reviews and audits of its tabling activities to ensure that they are established and operated in accordance with this policy; The Treaty Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development will monitor the effectiveness of this policy by periodically reviewing its own departmental procedures and other departments' and agencies' procedures, and All Departments will monitor the effectiveness of the policy within their own organizations.

References Authority This policy is issued pursuant to the approval of the Throne Speech of April 6, Introduction This Annex provides general guidance to departments and agencies on: the nature and significance of international agreements; the normal procedure for obtaining policy approval prior to entering into negotiations with other States; the procedure through which instruments intended to be binding under public international law are concluded between Canada and another State or an international organization, or among several States within a multilateral context; the process for obtaining the legal authority required to sign and ratify agreements; the procedure for tabling treaties in the House of Commons; the steps involved in: bringing the agreements into force; their safekeeping; registration with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and with the International Civil Aviation Organization specifically for Aviation Agreements; and publication of the agreements.

The Convention defines a treaty as follows: ""Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

Article 26 of the Convention states: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

Normal Procedures for Policy Approval to Negotiate The significance of creating and formalizing an international obligation on behalf of Canada should not be underestimated. When a treaty: requires legislative changes; relates to the mandate of more than one Minister; creates new obligations for Canada; is extremely complex; is multilateral; is likely to represent a significant change in Canada 's foreign policy; will have a major impact on domestic policy; will have a major impact on federal-provincial relations; or will entail significant financial pressure on the fiscal framework.

The MC should set out, among other things: the expected purpose of the agreement, and its relation to existing agreements; its potential foreign policy implications; its possible domestic impact; a preliminary outline of any financial obligation that may be incurred; and legislative changes that may be necessary if the negotiations prove successful.

In most cases, blanket authority has been granted when: no new legislation is required to undertake the obligations or amendments to the actual legislation; there are no funding implications; and there are no interdepartmental or federal-provincial jurisdictional issues.

Negotiating a Treaty The negotiation of a treaty is carried out under the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or another Minister in close cooperation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Treaty Section will: complete a thorough linguistic and legal review of the text; assist in negotiating and completing administrative articles and final clauses covering signature, entry into force, amendment, termination, etc.

Signature Signature requires that Cabinet provide policy approval of the treaty, as well as the seeking of legal authority through an Order in Council to sign the treaty. The MC should seek: approval of the text of the treaty in both official languages; policy approval to sign the treaty, as well as to ratify it should the Government so decide after the tabling period; policy approval for all resources required to implement the treaty; and policy approval to draft any legislation necessary to implement the treaty.

With rare exceptions, signatures are subject to ratification. Tabling in the House of Commons The Minister of Foreign Affairs will table all agreements, accompanied by a brief Explanatory Memorandum, in the House of Commons, for at least twenty-one sitting days before taking any action to bring the agreement into force. Legislation Some treaties, prior to their ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by Canada, require legislation.

Ratification Once the agreement and its Explanatory Memorandum have been tabled in the House of Commons, the waiting period passed, and any necessary legislation adopted, the Government will make a decision on whether to proceed to bind Canada to the treaty. Publishing, registration and safekeeping of Treaties The Treaty Section of DFATD is the Custodian of all originals of Canada's bilateral agreements and all certified copies of multilateral agreements to which Canada is a party, which are kept in the archive of the Treaty Section.

First and foremost, efforts should be made to simplify the current framework of relations between the EU and national parliaments, including the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments, the COSAC, the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU, the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol, the interparliamentary committee meetings and the joint parliamentary meetings, just to name a few.

The development of a committee-based approach would be extremely beneficial in this regard 7. The same applies to the implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning the role of national parliaments in the areas of freedom, security and justice see articles 70, 88 and 85 TFEU. At a time when these matters are all the more complex, the EU should call on all national parliaments, one of its major sources of democratic legitimacy, in order to ensure an active role in the monitoring of a future European Defence Union.

Thus, the participation and active involvement of national parliaments seems to be crucial and truly indispensable. The role of national parliaments with respect to the control of subsidiarity. Aware that this is one of its most important constitutional powers, national parliaments are unanimous in their evaluation of certain throttling in the functioning of the EWS, which may trigger the yellow card or the orange card procedures.

The first obstacle is the limited eight-week standstill period, which can only be altered with a Treaty reform and which should be increased once said reform occurs. There is, however, a technical question - with legal implications within the scope of the separation of powers - which might ease the burden of this obstacle. Indeed, the starting day to count the eight-week standstill period should not be left to the discretion of the Commission. Thus, as is the case with many national proceedings, a technical extension should be considered, in such a manner that the commencement of the eight-week period is not at the sole disposal of the Commission.

The second obstacle, yet just as importantly, relates to a narrow understanding of the principle of subsidiarity as provided for in article 5 TEU, which excludes the principle of conferral and the principle of proportionality.

This is the argument with which the Commission more often refuses national parliaments the exercise of this power of control. Yet, legal doctrine has long drawn a distinction between subsidiarity stricto sensu and lato sensu , the latter comprising the three dimensions enunciated. Prior experience shows that it is extremely difficult to understand the precise boundary between the political dimension of subsidiarity and the legal dimension of proportionality.

It being a fine line between politics and law, the Commission should exercise self-restraint, when referring to EWS, in the adoption of an overtly restrictive vision of the subsidiarity principle. In this regard, and after the concession made in the framework of the British referendum process, there are no appeals from national parliaments for a future red card.

Such an innovation would necessarily have three limits: it cannot be a true legislative initiative, as this is a right exclusively reserved to the Commission neither Parliament nor Council may initiate legislation ; it cannot be used in relation to the repeal of existing EU law as it would otherwise act as a reverse red card and, finally, it should not incorporate any right to amendment European legislation that would usurp powers assigned to the EP and Council by the Treaties.

The idea is, therefore, most commendable, as it reflects the right understanding of subsidiarity, to the extent that it means that national parliaments recognize that some matters are of exclusive competence of the Union.

At full deployment, it will be a right of proposal or suggestion that, similar to parallel mechanisms, could originate the obligation for a reasoned reply from the Commission in the event of refusal. Olivier Rozenberg. Ingolf Pernice. See Prof. The European Parliament ,. XVIII n. Scrutinising governmental activity in European affairs. Considers that the implementation of the rights and obligations of national parliaments deriving from the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced their role within the European constitutional framework, thus providing for more pluralism, democratic legitimacy and the better functioning of the Union;.

Acknowledges that national governments are democratically accountable to national parliaments as acknowledged by Article 10 2 TEU, in accordance with their respective national constitutional orders; takes the view that such accountability is the keystone of the role of national parliamentary chambers in the European Union; encourages national parliaments to fully exercise their European functions in order to directly influence and scrutinise the content of European policies, in particular via the monitoring of their national governments acting as members of the European Council and the Council;.

Takes the view that care needs to be taken to avoid any kind of gold-plating of EU legislation by Member States and that national parliaments have a key role to play in this regard; recalls, at the same time, that this is without prejudice to the right of Member States to apply non-regression clauses and to lay down, for example, higher social and environmental standards at national level;.

Recalls, while encouraging strengthened and political dialogue with national parliaments and recognising the clear need to reinforce parliamentary participation, that decisions must be taken in accordance with constitutional competences and by taking into account the clear delineation between the respective decision-making competences of the national and European bodies;. States that the European Parliament and national parliaments should be better involved in the European Semester and recommends that budgetary calendars at national and European level are better coordinated throughout the process in order to encourage more effective use of this instrument; recalls, moreover, that the alignment of the European Semester with the agendas of national parliaments could further contribute to the coordination of economic policies, while underlining that such alignment should not disregard the powers of self-governance and the specific rules of procedure of each parliamentary chamber;.

Suggests the implementation of a national period for budgetary dialogue, during which national parliaments would be able to deliberate upon and contribute to the European Semester by providing their governments with a mandate in their relations with the Commission and the Council;. Creating a European public sphere. Notes that the alignment of different political stances across the Member States could strengthen and expand cross-sectional debates at European level; recommends, therefore, that national parliamentary delegations acting before the European Institutions should reflect political diversity; stresses the relevance of the principle of proportional representation of members from different political parties in this regard;.

Notes the fact that the binding will of parliamentary majorities could be expressed in the opinions issued by national parliaments, within or outside the framework of the EWS; endorses the idea, however, of national parliamentary political minorities being given the possibility to express dissenting points of view, which could then be incorporated into the annexes to such opinions; believes that these opinions should be issued in full compliance with the principle of proportionality and in accordance with the rules of procedure of each national parliamentary chamber;.

Takes good note of the recent call for a series of democratic conventions across Europe; believes, in this regard, that the establishment of an annual European week would allow MEPs and Commissioners, notably Vice-Presidents in charge of Clusters, to stand before all national parliamentary assemblies in order to discuss and explain the European agenda alongside with MPs and representatives of civil society; suggests reviewing its own rules of procedure in order to endorse the initiative, and encourages national parliaments to do the same; further believes that meetings between national and European political groups in the framework of EU interparliamentary cooperation could bring added value in the form of an authentic European political debate;.

Backing reform of the EWS. Invites the Commission to reflect constructively with Parliament on the existing FA and its implementation, paying particular attention to the negotiation, adoption and implementation of international agreements;. Regarding international agreements, recalls the prerogative of Parliament to ask the Council not to authorise the opening of negotiations until Parliament has stated its position on a proposed negotiating mandate, and believes that consideration should be given to an FA with the Council; reminds the Commission of the need to abstain from provisional application of trade agreements before Parliament has given its consent to the conclusion thereof, except in cases where Parliament has given its express permission, in order to fully comply with the principle of loyal cooperation and avoid legal uncertainty; believes that Parliament should adopt the necessary measures to monitor the implementation of international agreements and the fulfilment of the obligations established therein;.

Believes that, given the interest of both sides in exchanging information and best practice in relation to mixed agreements and scrutiny of the executive, serious thought should be given to involving national parliaments and national experts to a greater extent in the work of Parliament.

Date adopted. Substitute s under Rule 2 present for the final vote. Rapporteur: Eva Lichtenberger. The Committee on Legal Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution:. Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty increased the role and powers of the European Parliament in the field of international agreements and points out that today international agreements increasingly cover areas which concern the everyday lives of citizens and which traditionally, and under EU primary law, fall within the scope of ordinary legislative procedures; considers that it is imperative that the provision in Article 10 TFEU, which stipulates that Parliament must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for concluding international agreements is applied in a way which is compatible with Article 10 TEU, pursuant to which the functioning of the Union is based on representative democracy, which requires transparency and democratic debates on the issues to be decided;.

Highlights the greater role given to national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty and stresses that, alongside the role which they play in monitoring respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, they can and do make positive contributions in the framework of the Political Dialogue; considers that the active role which the national parliaments can play in guiding the members of the Council of Ministers and good cooperation between the European Parliament and the national parliaments can help to establish a healthy parliamentary counterbalance to the exercise of executive power in the functioning of the EU; refers also to reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments under Article 7 2 of Protocol No 2, which state that the broad scope of delegation under Article TFEU in a proposed act does not make it possible to assess whether or not the concrete legislative reality would be in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity.

The decision by the European Council to effectively remove the above-mentioned articles from the draft regulation was made on 29 June Rapporteur: Nuno Melo. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution:. Points out that Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union TEU contains a list of the common values on which the Union is founded; believes that respect for those values should be properly ensured by both the Union and the Member States; points out that a proper legislative and institutional system should be established in order to protect the values of the Union;.

Recalls that the European Parliament is now a fully fledged institutional actor in the field of security policies, and is therefore entitled to participate actively in determining the features and priorities of those policies and in evaluating instruments in this field, a process to be conducted jointly by the European Parliament, national parliaments and the Council; believes that the European Parliament ought to play a crucial role in the evaluation and definition of internal security policies, as they have a profound impact on the fundamental rights of all those living in the EU; emphasises, therefore, the need to ensure that such policies fall within the remit of the only directly elected European institution as regards scrutiny and democratic oversight;.

Emphasises the particular significance and consequence of the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty; points out that the Charter has become legally binding on the EU institutions and on the Member States when implementing Union law, thereby transforming basic values into concrete rights;. Points out that under the Treaty a legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts; calls on the Commission to make an adequate distinction between delegated and implementing acts when proposing legislation, so as to ensure that the appropriate type of act is applied; believes that measures implying urgent temporary deviation from the rules established by the basic act should be adopted by means of delegated acts, where the basic act is adopted according to the ordinary legislative procedure;.

Urges the Council, with a view to ensuring sincere cooperation and open and continuous dialogue between the institutions involved in the legislative process, to consider making it possible for European Parliament representatives to participate in certain of its meetings such as those of working groups and COREPER , as is already the case for Commission representatives;.

Welcomes the fact that under the Treaty of Lisbon greater democratisation is also linked to greater participation by national parliaments in the procedure for adopting legislative acts, particularly in relation to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity;.

Stresses the need for sincere cooperation between the institutions involved in the legislative procedure in relation to the exchange of documents, such as legal opinions, so as to allow a constructive, frank and legally valid dialogue between institutions. Document stages in plenary. Debates :. PE Committee on Constitutional Affairs. Reaffirms that all European political parties should appoint their candidates for President of the Commission sufficiently in advance of the scheduled date for the European elections; 5.

Expects candidates for President of the Commission to play a significant role in the campaign for the European elections, by distributing and promoting in all Member States the political programme of their European political party; 6. Requests that as many Members of the next Commission as possible be chosen from among elected Members of the European Parliament; 8.

Takes the view, further to the political understanding reached at the meeting of the European Council on 11 and 12 December and following the decision of the European Council on 22 May concerning the number of Members of the European Commission, that additional measures, such as the appointment of Commissioners without portfolio or the establishment of a system of Vice-Presidents of the Commission with responsibilities over major thematic clusters and with competences to coordinate the work of the Commission in the corresponding areas, should be envisaged for the more effective functioning of the Commission, without prejudice to the right to appoint one Commissioner per Member State and to the voting right of all Commissioners; Calls on the next Convention to revisit the question of the size of the Commission, as well as that of its organisation and functioning; Stresses that, as mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, the candidate for President of the Commission should be requested to present to the European Parliament, after his or her designation by the European Council, the political guidelines for his or her mandate, followed by a comprehensive exchange of views, before Parliament elects the proposed candidate for President of the Commission; Urges the future President-designate of the Commission to take due account of the proposals and recommendations for European Union legislation previously made by Parliament on the basis of own-initiative reports or resolutions which received the support of a wide majority of the Members of the European Parliament and which the former Commission had not satisfactorily followed up by the end of its mandate; Considers that, in a future revision of the Treaties, the majority currently required under Article TFEU for a motion of censure against the Commission should be lowered so as to require only a majority of the component Members of the European Parliament, without putting the functioning of the institutions at risk; Considers that, notwithstanding the collective responsibility of the college for the actions of the Commission, individual Commissioners may be held accountable for the actions of their Directorates-General; Legislative initiative and activity Parliamentary competence and scrutiny Stresses the need for sincere cooperation between the institutions involved in the legislative procedure in relation to the exchange of documents, such as legal opinions, so as to allow a constructive, frank and legally valid dialogue between institutions; Notes that since the TFEU entered into force, Parliament has proved to be a committed and responsible co-legislator and that interaction between Parliament and the Commission has, overall, been positive and based on fluid communication and a cooperative approach; Takes the view that, while the overall assessment of interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the Commission is positive, there are still a number of issues and shortcomings, which call for closer attention and action; Stresses that the challenge of transparency is ever-present and common to all institutions, especially in first-reading agreements; notes that Parliament responded properly to this challenge by adopting the new Rules 70 and 70a of its Rules of Procedure; Asks the Commission to make better use of the pre-legislative phase, in particular of the valuable input collected on the basis of Green and White Papers, and routinely inform the European Parliament of preparatory work carried out by its services, on an equal footing with the Council; Takes the view that Parliament ought to further develop and make full use of its autonomous structure for assessing the impact of any substantial changes or modifications to the original proposal submitted by the Commission; Emphasises that the European Parliament should also strengthen its autonomous assessment of the impact on fundamental rights of legislative proposals and amendments under consideration as part of the legislative process and establish mechanisms to monitor human rights violations; Draws attention to the need to distinguish properly between the essential elements of a legislative act, which can only be decided upon by the legislative authority in the legislative act itself, and non-essential elements, which can be supplemented or amended by means of delegated acts; Understands that delegated acts can be a flexible and effective tool; stresses the importance of the choice between delegated acts and implementing acts from the point of view of the respect of the Treaty requirements while safeguarding the rule-making prerogatives of Parliament, and reiterates its request to the Commission and the Council to agree with Parliament on the application of criteria for the use of Articles and TFEU, so that implementing acts are not used as a substitute for delegated acts; Urges the Commission to involve Parliament adequately in the preparatory phase of the delegated acts and to provide its Members with all relevant information, pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission; Emphasises the particular significance and consequence of the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty; points out that the Charter has become legally binding upon the EU institutions and upon the Member States when implementing Union law, thereby transforming basic values into specific rights; Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty increased the role and powers of the European Parliament in the field of international agreements, and points out that international agreements now increasingly cover areas which concern the everyday lives of citizens and which traditionally, and under EU primary law, fall within the scope of ordinary legislative procedures; considers that it is imperative that the provision in Article 10 TFEU, which stipulates that Parliament must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for concluding international agreements, is applied in a way which is compatible with Article 10 TEU, pursuant to which the functioning of the Union is based on representative democracy, which requires transparency and democratic debate on the issues to be decided;